Polls in Tamil Nadu: A backgrounder
Among the
ten States[1]
where the Congress lost power in 1967, the party could never regain it, even
once after that in Tamil Nadu. One may see this as due to the caste-wise make
up of the population in Tamil Nadu as well as the long term dynamics of this in
the making of the political history of the State. Unlike in those parts of the
country with a fairly large percentage of the Upper Castes in the population,
their proportion to the population is low in Tamil Nadu. It may be noted that
unlike in the Gangetic valley, the category on non-Brahmin Upper Castes (such
as the Bhumihar and the Rajputs), constituting the landed aristocracy, is
almost absent in Tamil Nadu. This distinct feature lent a certain dynamic to
the socio-political discourse in the State.
Seen
against this basic feature, the consolidation of pro-British forces in the
early decades of the 20th Century (in the context of the
Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909 and the Montagu Chelmsford Reforms of 1919), as
opposed to the Indian National Congress and the idea of freedom then served as
a nucleus for the making of the anti-Congress platform historically. This was
not the case with most other parts of the country where the feudatories, after
flirting with the colonial rulers in the context of the Constitutional reforms,
hastened to join the Indian National Congress and even managed to capture its
organisation in many levels before 1947. The launch of the self-respect
movement by Periyar E.V.Ramasami Naicker, after he raised the issue of
untouchability being practised in the Congress-run schools and walked out of
the Indian National Congress (in 1924), also gathered the feudatories around
the platform as early as at the time of the elections to the Madras Provincial
Assembly under the Government of India Act, 1935.
This
consolidation received an impetus when the Rajaji-led Provincial Government
(1937-1939) moved to make the learning of Hindi compulsory in schools. The
anti-Hindi agitation and the Self Respect Movement laid the foundation for the
non-Congress political formation in the State and the formation of the DMK in
1949, even if it was possible only after C.N.Annadurai walked out of Periyar’s
embrace, meant the emergence of an anti-Congress force. It may be true that the
a similar pattern may be seen in the Socialst Party’s formation, in 1948, from
out of the Congress and its emergence as a challenger to the Congress in the first
general election. But then, those who founded the Socialist Party, from out of
the Congress Socialist Party (the members of the Nashik group who acted from
within the Indian National Congress) since the early 1930s, did not enlist the
feudatories as did the DMK in its early stages. The way the Congress, under
Rajaji, cobbled up a majority after the first general elections, to form its
own government in Madras, lent to the opposition a certain force to emerge into
the anti-Congress platform as early as after the first general election.[2]
The impressive performance by the Common Wheel Party (CWP) in that election,
specifically in what is now the Northern Tamil Nadu, laid the basis for the DMK
emerging as a force in that region; in social terms, this manifest in the
consolidation of the Vanniyar community, who had rallied behind the CWP in the
1951-52 elections, to make the muscle for the DMK by 1957 (by which time the
CWP had dissolved). In the decade from then, the DMK grew into the force that
wrested power from the Congress in the State (rechristened Tamil Nadu after
C.N.Annadurai raised the demand after his entry into the Rajya Sabha in 1962),
and consolidated itself into the sole representative of the intermediary social
classes across Tamil Nadu.
The consolidation was further
made possible when the State Government initiated reservation in State
Government jobs for the OBCs in pursuance of the recommendations of the
Sattanathan Commission in the 1960s; and what began in the Northern Tamil Nadu
now spread across the State and thus the DMK ensured the Congress party
remained out of power. This would happen in Uttar Pradesh or Bihar, only after
1990 and after the Mandal Commission recommendations (reservation for OBCs in
Central Government jobs) were implemented.[3]
The DMK, however, underwent a split soon; if not as early as did the
non-Congress formations that wrested power in in Uttar Pradesh and elsewhere in
1967. The birth of the ADMK in 1972, under M.G.Ramachandran, matinee idol and
treasurer of the DMK until he was expelled, marked the beginning of the
fragmentation that now characterises the political discourse in Tamil Nadu and
also revived the Congress into a relevant force. The Congress in Tamil Nadu could
re-invent itself as determining the outcome of elections and the DMK and the
ADMK would ally with the `national’ party to win elections. Meanwhile, the OBC
consolidation remained a feature of the state’s discourse even under the ADMK’s
rule. The Ambasankar Committee of 1985 took the idea of reservation to OBCs to
69 per cent of the State Government jobs even while the Congress Government in
Delhi allowed the Mandal Commission Report gather dust.
All these are now things of the
past. Neither the ADMK nor the DMK want to touch the Congress this time. This
is just the opposite of what it was in the 1980s when both the Kazhagams were
desperate to have the Congress on its
side and it is a fact that for a couple of decades since then, the one that had
the Congress as ally won elections in Tamil Nadu; it was the ADMK in 1984, 1989
and 1991; and the DMK in 2004 and 2009. The story was a little different in
1996 when the DMK had the Tamil Maanila Congress with it (leaving the rump of
the Congress with the ADMK) or the ADMK-BJP alliance making it big in 1998 and
the DMK-BJP alliance in 1999. A feature in all these years since the 1980s was
that the political discourse in Tamil Nadu revolved around two formations;
around the DMK or the ADMK. This, too is a thing of the past insofar as April
2014 is concerned. The extent of fragmentation is such that each of the 39 Lok
Sabha constituency in Tamil Nadu will witness a three cornered contest this
time. Apart from the DMK (or its allies) and the ADMK (just by itself), there
is the NDA (consisting of small parties that command support in areas that are
exclusive to each other). The Congress may have fielded candidates everywhere
but is indeed an insignificant player all over. Notwithstanding the bravado
displayed by a Karthi Chidambaram or a Mani Shankar Aiyer! And in a few
constituencies where the Left has been forced to contest (after being shown the
door by Jayalalitha) its candidates may just be counted as adding a fourth
corner to the contest; but may end up forfeiting their deposits.
The fact is that the contest in
Tamil Nadu remains between the ADMK and the DMK;it may also be added that April
2014 is indeed an opportunity, in the true sense of the term, for M.K.Stalin to
establish his own hold over the party organisation. The party may end up losing
seats and if trends in the past couple of elections were to continue, he may
end up in a situation where he will stand alone as the DMK’s leader; such
others as Dayanidhi Maran and A.Raja as well as his step-sister M.Kanimozhi,
who had emerged as power centres within the party may go into oblivion after
May 16, 2014 while M.K.Alagiri may soon end up facing criminal charges that
Jayalalitha is certain to slap against him once he damages the little prospect
that the DMK has in this election. The ADMK chief will like to have him around
and speak against his father and his brother until April 24, 2014 and she may
not even wait until May 16, 2014 to put him in place.
And this leaves us with the front
consisting of the DMDK, MDMK, PMK, IJK and the BJP to be talked about. None of
them, indeed, are even as significant as the Apna Dal in Uttar Pradesh, with
whom the BJP has tied up. Sonelal Patel’s party in UP can help Narendra Modi rest assured of a
chunk of votes in Varanasi Lok Sabha constituency. But the parties that now
constitute the NDA in Tamil Nadu are at mutual war with one another and either
exist in mutually exclusive zones. Vaiko’s MDMK for instance exists in only his
hometown and is not strong enough even there to win an assembly segment on its
own. The IJK, meanwhile, has not even shown its clout in panchayats where it
has put up candidates notwithstanding the money that its patron has with him,
thanks to his enterprise in higher education! The PMK, whose emergence in the
1980s (representing the beginnings of the process of fragmentation of the
state’s political discourse) had begun to weaken almost a decade ago and is now
a spent force. And as for the DMDK, Vijaykanth had shown potential to emerge as
a pan-Tamil Nadu party since he entered the political arena in May 2006; his
party, fighting alone, polled close to 10 per cent in the first elections. And
he imagined himself as a king-maker when Jayalalitha (with whom he entered into
an alliance for the May 2011 assembly elections) only to end up as Leader of
the Opposition and subsequently with a section of his MLAs trooping out of his
party to support Jayalalitha. The DMDK could re-invent itself now only by
riding piggy back on Narendra Modi; well, the BJP too found itself forced into
a situation to ride piggy back on Vijaykanth! In any case, this could only have
relevance as a long term strategy and certainly longer than May 2014.
Tamil Nadu, in April-May 2014,may
witness a multi-cornered contest and this is certainly a departure from the
decisive break in the political discourse as witnessed in 1967. The element
that was most pronounced in that year – the Congress party’s defeat – remains
an integral part now too. It is a point of no return. But the other aspect of
the 1967 elections – consolidation of the OBCs as a decisive factor behind the
DMK’s emergence – is now over and the fragmentation in the socio-political
sense has thrown the field wide open to a radical realignment of forces. The
DMK, in this context, has the potential to re-invent itself, ahead of the assembly
elections scheduled for May 2016, if the party, under M.K.Stalin’s leadership, consolidates
the alliance it has now forged with the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK)
and the Puthiya Tamilagham (PT), two mutually antagonistic Dalit platforms
holding a base in the Northern and Southern parts of Tamil Nadu respectively,
keep its relationship with the small outfits that have arrived as
representatives of the Muslim community in the State and also regain its
support base that it lost to the PMK in the last few decades. As for now, it is
the ADMK all the way.
[1]
The Congress party lost a majority in the elections to the State assemblies of
Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Bihar, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab, West Bengal
and Uttar Pradesh.
[2] The
Congress did not win a majority in the Madras Legislative Assembly in the
1951-52 general elections; and an attempt to forge a non-Congress government
including forces across the Left and the Right and around the Common Wheel
Party was scuttled when Rajaji enlisted support of a section of the
independents to form the Congress Government in the State. The CWP, in fact,
was an expression of the early consolidation of the intermediate castes against
the Indian National Congress then.
[3]
Itmay be stressed here that the SVD and the BKD Governments that came in Bihar
and Uttar Pradesh in 1967 initiated reservation for OBCs in these two States
but the consolidation in the political sense was not as strong as in Tamil Nadu
for two specific reasons; one that the clout of the Brahmans along with the
other upper castes were numerically and economically huge in comparison with
that in Tamil Nadu and two that the SVD and the BKD did not constitute a
coherent platform as did the DMK and the non-Congress governments in Bihar and
Uttar Pradesh epitomised instability and the combines splintered within months
due to internecine conflicts among its leaders.
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