Why the talk of a Third Front will fail to excite...
Neither
the Congress nor the BJP will win a majority in the general elections due in summer
2014. This, however, does not mean, in any way, a non-Congress-non-BJP (a third
front) emerging the winner. What began as a coalition against the Congress in
the 1960s (and making it to power in nine States in 1967), remained a strong
force in the national political discourse for at least a couple of decades
until the collapse of the V.P.Singh government in November 1990.
This anti-Congress coalition
formed the basis for what came to be known as the third front in the aftermath
of the BJP, riding on the Hindutwa and the anti-Mandal wave, supplanted the Congress in Uttar
Pradesh and elsewhere in the Gangetic region. Unlike the V.P.Singh-led National
Front Government (1989-90), the Deve Gowda-led United Front of (1996-98) was
conceived and carried out to keep the BJP out.
There was one common thread in
these two coalitions: The quest for power in the leaders who controlled
regional parties and factions within those. They detested ideology; but were
not averse to pretending otherwise as long as they could use it to gloss their games.
In the post-1998 phase, these leaders have chosen to be `honest’ in the sense
that they do not pretend any ideology. And this is what makes the `third front’
a mere rhetoric.
The Congress and the BJP,
together, are relevant in less than 300 out of the 544 Lok Sabha seats. It is
also true that these two parties are a force, predominantly, in those parts
that were known the Indian States – where the colonial administration retained
the princes as rulers – and have lost out in those parts of the country that
were directly under British administration and hence the parts where the
struggle for independence took place.
The BJP, for instance, is in
battle with the Congress in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Chattisgarh and these
states were all carved out of regions where the princes ruled on behalf of the
British. It is not different in parts of Gujarat Karnataka and Maharashtra
while it is a different story in Hyderabad, Travancore and Tripura (also states
ruled by princes but where there was a strong people’s movement against the
system).
In other words, neither the Congress nor the
BJP is strong enough to win in those parts where the struggle for independence
had dominated and impacted the political discourse and turned it democratic.
Neither the Congress nor the BJP are looked at as winners in Uttar Pradesh,
West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Bihar, from where over 200 MPs will be elected are
all dominated by non-Congress, non-BJP parties. And insofar as 2014 is
concerned, this is true of Orissa and Andhra Pradesh too. On the face of it,
this should make a non-Congress, non-BJP front possible.
But then, it is possible only if
the Left and the Trinamool, the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party,
the DMK and AIADMK, the JD(U) and the RJD get together. Even if it means a
situation where the leaders of these parties reconcile to this idea for the
sake of power and the spoils that come with it (there are more airwaves and
mines and SEZs to be sold out to carpet baggers), they will require help from
either the Congress or the BJP; 273 MPs are needed to make a government.
Well. This was achieved by Madhu
Koda in Jharkhand in the past; but not all that easy in New Delhi. It is not
that the parties are struck by ethical and moral scruples. It is simply because
both the Congress and the BJP have shown, by their action, that they are game
for a coalition with anyone. And the non-Congress, non-BJP parties too (from
whom the third front mirage emanates) too have learnt from the past that the
experiments of 1989 and 1996 (a government with outside support from the BJP or
the Congress) is unstable and hence not a safe bet to strike deals and make
hay.
On the other hand, the experience
with coalitions that the BJP led between 1998 and 2004 and that the Congress
led between 2004 and 2014 allowed these leaders to not just make hay but also
more than hay. Recall the spectrum sale and the windfall gains to some who were
at helm in the ministry, even if one considers Vinod Rai to have exaggerated,
was more than what the leaders of that party could have thought of when they
wielded power in 1989-90 and later on in 1996-98. And the fact is that most of
these parties remained in the ruling coalition, whether it was communal or
secular. And some others find it prudent to switch allegiance to keep the CBI
at bay.
Hence it is idle to argue that
the third front is a possibility.
